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Abstract 
This article introduces a sociological theory of blame games, focusing on the recent financial crisis in 
the United States (2007-2010). Many actors could be held responsible for the crisis. Such a situation is 
socially explosive, leading to an intense blame game, which finds its resolution when a main culprit is 
found. Blame games are not irrational outbursts of anger, but rather, structured and dynamic processes 
of boundary drawing. They are power games, mediated by public discourse, which lead to a 
reassertion of collective values. I develop my theory by studying three national newspapers (The New 
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and USA Today) from August 2007 to June 2010. I present a 
statistical, network and content analysis of the 5,712 blaming incidences identified. I show how when 
the financial system exploded, blame moved in many directions, but mostly focused on the political 
sphere. Through public speeches, congressional hearings, and public investigations, the political 
sphere managed to refocus the attention on Wall Street. A blame game dominated by Democrats led to 
the crystallization of Wall Street's culpability. Such crystallization could not be predicted ex-ante.  
Keywords 
Blame games, Responsibility, Financial crisis, Disasters, Unsettled times. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
This article describes the blame game for the financial crisis in the United States (2007-2010), 
analyzing its evolution and its key drivers. The crisis appears as a cancer that expanded and 
metastasized. It started when the subprime mortgage market began to display an increasing rate of 
mortgage defaults in late 2006, which led to a decline in housing prices after nearly a decade of 
exceptionally high growth.  These defaults caused a collapse in the value of mortgage related 
investments, allowing these problems to spread from the mortgage market to financial markets. On 
September 15th 2008, Lehman Brothers, one of the world’s largest investment banks, declared 
bankruptcy.  The government seized the nation’s largest insurance company and largest savings and 
loan bank.  
The $700 billion bailout plan, passed by Congress in October 2008, and actions by the Federal 
Reserve to bolster the economy prevented a full-scale meltdown. By mid-2009, it appeared that a 
financial meltdown had been avoided. By the year's end, many big banks were reporting large profits 
and were in the process of returning their bailout money to the federal government. But many 
businesses, especially small ones, reported that credit was still tight. Moreover only a fraction of those 
homeowners the Obama administration had hoped to help had reached agreements with their banks. 
Unemployment rose to its highest point in more than 15 years. The discrepancy between Wall Street’s 
fast recovery and Main Street’s slow recovery generated anger over the crisis, the banks, the bailout 
and new rounds of large bonuses.  
Anger over the crisis triggered a burning question: who is responsible for this disaster? Many 
actors could be deemed responsible, in a seemingly never-ending causal chain. It would include the 
individuals who took massive mortgages that they could not afford, the mortgage brokers and lenders 
who sold them defective or overpriced loans, the investments banks who packaged and distributed 
them without properly assessing their risk, the credit rating agencies who certified they were safe, the 
regulators who kept the money flowing – among many others. This can explain why Phil Angelides, 
the head of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, in charge of investigating the causes of the crisis, 
said: “Maybe this is like the Murder on the Orient Express: everyone did it.”1  
I argue that a situation where everybody is potentially responsible is socially explosive. It 
paves the way for an intense blame game, which I define as a dynamic process of accusations and 
counter-accusations. Such contention finds its resolution when the main culprit is found (Girard [1972] 
1977) – in this case, Wall Street. A blame game is a mechanism to reestablish a disrupted social order. 
Processes of blaming and punishing allow members of a society to express indignation at acts that 
offend the collective conscience, thereby affirming collective values and fostering social cohesion 
(Durkheim [1893] 1964). In a blame game, actors are trying to shift the symbolic boundaries between 
“worthy us” and “unworthy them” (Douglas 2003, Lamont 2009, Tilly 2008). Altogether these 
accusation dynamics form what I call a field of accusation: a public sphere where actors compete to 
assign responsibility for a disaster in a game of accusations and counter-accusations. 
This study analyzes how a blame game participated in the crystallization of Wall Street’s 
responsibility. This crystallization might seem unsurprising years later. It was not fully predictable. 
After all, the Great Depression is greatly associated with President Hoover. One could reasonably have 
expected a focus on the Bush administration, in power until January 2009.  One could also have 
expected a crystallization on regulators. I show that regulators were the main culprits till the final 
resolution. As Hay (2010) argues speaking of the British case, “blaming the bankers may be cathartic, 
but it actually serves to displace responsibility from those whose policy choices brought us where we 
are.” Hay (1996) shows that crises narratives are constructed. I would then add that the important 
question is: by whom, and how? I expose how powerful actors could orient the blame towards Wall 
Street. In the fall of 2008, the financial meltdown opened a deep period of soul searching. Blame 
                                                     
1 Source: “Voices That Dominate Wall Street Take a Meeker Tone on Capitol Hill”, The New York Times, January 14th 2010 
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moved in many directions. The political sphere (and Democrats in particular) directed public anger 
through public speeches and events.  
To develop my theory, I conducted a media analysis. I manually built a data set of 5,712 
blaming incidences, drawn from three national newspapers from August 2007 to June 2010. The 
rationale for focusing on the media is two-fold. The media shapes and is shaped by collective 
processes of sense making. It adequately reveals the evolution of the public discourse. As Gamson and 
Modigliani (1989:2) put it  “media discourse is part of the process by which individuals construct 
meaning, and public opinion is part of the process by which journalists (...) develop and crystallize 
meaning in public discourse.” In the “master forum” of the media (Ferree 2002), actors present 
competing narratives for the crisis and its perpetrators, thus actively participating in ongoing processes 
of sense making. The media is not only a forum for public opinion. It is also a key motor of social 
change.  Actors (re)define moral and immoral behavior through their public blame games. Erikson 
(1966:12) noted that the media had replaced the carnival atmosphere of the Tyburn, where wrongdoers 
were exposed in the town square. The end of these practices coincides with the development of 
newspapers as mass media. In these new public scaffolds, the line between morality and immorality is 
drawn.  
My goal is to build a theory of blame games, and of their effect on the social order. Blame 
figures prominently in many sociological studies, as I will detail later. To my knowledge, no 
sociological study has tried to capture blame game dynamics. Synthesizing theories of framing and 
blame, I argue that blame games are not irrational outbursts of anger (Bucher 1957), but structured and 
dynamic processes of boundary drawing. Blame games are power games, mediated by public 
discourse, which lead to the reevaluation and reassertion of collective values. My goal is also to 
produce a deeper understanding of the financial crisis. Very few studies have endeavored to capture 
blame incidences in the crisis in-depth. And they have generally been conducted in Europe, by 
political scientists, using surveys (Bennett and Kottasz 2012, Hellwig and Coffey 2011, Hobolt and 
Tilley 2014, Tourish and Hargie 2012, Wagner 2014).  
Most current research has focused on the roots of the crisis (Beunza and Stark 2012, 
Carruthers 2013, Davis 2009, Fligstein and Goldstein 2015, Krippner 2011, Mizruchi 2013, Polillo 
2013, Rugh and Massey 2010, Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) or on its consequences (Brooks and 
Manza 2013, Grusky, Western and Wimer 2011, Lounsbury and Hirsch 2010).   The three notable 
exceptions in sociology are Treas (2010) who refutes the “blaming the victim” ideology; Perrow 
(2011) who recuses the “normal accident” or neo-institutionalist accounts for the crisis; and von 
Scheve, Zink and Ismer (2014) who study the connection between frames of responsibility and logics 
of action. This is all the more surprising as processes of sense making and responsibility assignment 
indirectly inform the regulation of the banking system. The strictest set of banking regulations was 
produced in the 1930s, when the Pecora commission illuminated the role of major banks in the 1929 
crisis. 
 
Risk, blame, and power games 
 
Unsettled times and sense making 
 
The financial crisis undoubtedly falls into the category of what Swidler (1986) calls “unsettled times.” 
Unlike settled times, characterized by consensual, taken-for-granted repertoires for action, in 
“unsettled times” different sets of cultural assumptions are in competition. An unanticipated event 
leads to a burst of public anxiety. It threatens the pre-established social order. However the actual 
process through which social transformation is produced during unsettled times remains to be better 
understood (Bail 2012). How does a society fall into unsettled times, and reach a new equilibrium? I 
show how blame games are key to understanding the unsettling and resettling of a social order. 
Largely unanticipated events, such as the financial meltdown, lead to a deep turmoil. But by drawing 
boundaries between “worthy us” and “unworthy them,” powerful actors can define deviance in such a 
way as to maintain their power (Abolafia and Kilduff 1988, Erikson 1966). 
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Unsettled times pave the way for a competition between distinct and stable frames grounded in 
political ideologies. Swidler (1986) argues that actors rely on preexisting ideologies in a context of 
radical uncertainty. She defines ideologies as “highly articulated, self-conscious belief and ritual 
systems” (1986:279).  Unsettled times can also lead to an explosion of blame. Abolafia and Kilduff 
(1988) show that in mania phases blame is latent, and in distress phases blame explodes. This phase of 
distress calls for a strong intervention of agents of social control, who can reestablish consensual 
strategies of action. I then posit that the overall matrix of blame（ ）who blames who might be both 
more populated and more stable from September 2008 on. By stable, I mean matrices that are highly 
correlated from one month to the other. It is time to punch, to punch hard, and to punch consistently – 
until a main culprit is found.  
A competing hypothesis could be drawn. This crisis stands out by its magnitude and 
complexity. The financial meltdown could lead to what Weick (1993) calls a “cosmology episode”. 
The understanding of the events and the means to rebuild that understanding falter together. In 
September 2008, few people know what a derivative is, how it was used and by whom. Few people 
know what happened inside each institution – and nobody can link all the facts together yet. The 
economic system is composed of an intricate web of deeply interconnected and opaque organizations. 
Making sense of a complex disaster takes time. An offense must be named before blame and claims 
can be formulated (Felstiner, Abel and Sarat 1980). I could observe a low level of intensity, and low 
level of consistency of blame from September 2008 on. Blaming incidences could be chaotic, until 
powerful actors reestablish consensus.  
Two competing hypotheses can be drawn from the literature: either an upsurge in intensity and 
stability of blame as the system explodes, or the exact opposite pattern. In either case, the crisis could 
be decomposed in three phases: unawareness, distress, and settlement. The settlement will happen 
through a blame game led by powerful actors. The challenge is then to understand who these actors 
are, and how they can impose a dominant frame.  
 
Risk and blame 
 
The research on frames illuminates the “resonance” of frames within a political and historical context 
(Benford and Snow 2000, Snow and Benford 1988) but tends to disconnect frames from the actors that 
produce them (Bail 2012, Benford 1997, Ferree 2003, Steensland 2008). I reconnect frames to actors 
engaged in uneven power games. These power games contribute to the resonance of frames with a 
wider context. A plethora of literature (in political science notably) shows that the political sphere 
dominates these power games. 
The political sphere has the capacity to set the news agenda (for a review see (Berkowitz 
1992, 2009)), which in turn will profoundly shape public opinion (McCombs and Shaw 1972, 1993). 
(Gans 1979:119) describes the relationship between sources and journalists as a dance, with the 
sources generally being the leader. The power of the State to shape public discourse is increased by 
major disruptions (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:99-108). They give political elites an even greater 
influence in establishing frames, which will then guide journalists and audience thinking (Entman 
2004). The ruling government is the most powerful (Entman 2003, Gans 1979:116-45). Logically the 
November 2008 presidential election could shift the balance of power towards Democrats. In the 
absence of political elite opposition, the White House frame could be widely echoed in the media. 
Open disagreement among the political elites determines whether the media diverges from the ruling 
government line (Bennett 1990).  
This predominance could orient the blame in two directions. Elected officials have an interest 
in blaming their political opponents. Democrats could strongly blame the Bush administration, first to 
get elected, and then to justify difficult decisions (Weaver 1986). Bush could then face the same 
destiny as Hoover. This expectation is reasonable owing to the history of the Great Depression, and to 
the economic voting literature. The latter shows that the incumbent is generally blamed for economic 
downturns, and punished during elections (Powell and Whitten 1993, for a recent example see 
Hernández and Kriesi 2015). Elected officials also have an interest in blaming their targets of change. 
These targets could be related to market forces for Democrats and to State intervention in the economy 
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for Republicans. Democrats could also intensify their accusations against Wall Street as they are 
trying to impose regulations. 
This literature presents two shortcomings though. First, it undermines the capacity of other 
elites to shape the public discourse. Less is known on business sources’ influence in the media. 
Financial actors were cited most often in the 1987 crash news reports (Lasorsa and Reese 1990), 
though their expertise was used to explain the crash rather than to assign blame. I cannot exclude that 
their expertise might give them authority in the debate. Second, this literature tends to present non-
elites, and to some extent journalists, as mere recipients of dominant frames (Entman 2003, Strömbäck 
and Nord 2006). They are not given the full agency to choose or even influence dominant frames. 
These two shortcomings are problematic. A blame game is a dynamic relationship between accuser, 
accused, and audiences. Three conditions define the success of an accusation: the accuser has force 
and authority, the accused is unable to counter-attack, and the audience actively echoes it.  The roles 
of accuser, accused, and audience depend on specific blaming instances. The audience role mostly 
belongs to journalists. They make sense of the public discourse. 
These observations lead me to adopt a different approach to the study of responsibility for 
national disasters. First, I link accusatory frames to the actors that produce them, and replace these 
actors in uneven power structures. Second, I hypothesize that the political sphere (Democrats in 
particular) will orient the blame game. I capture the whole ecology of accusatory frames to validate 
this hypothesis. I systematically include all discourses of accusation, be they dominant or dominated. I 
expose the dynamics of a blame game, and its effect on dominant accusatory frames. The question is 
then to understand how politicians can impose a dominant accusatory frame.  
 
Blame game strategies  
 
Politicians can shape what, how, and when events are discussed in the public discourse. However, a 
constellation of actors tries and orients the blame in the public discourse. Actors’ structural position 
can explain their resources and logics of action. Actors deploy different strategies and alliances to 
dominate the blame game. 
First, politicians can set the agenda, namely what is being discussed. This capacity is both 
positive and negative. They can direct the attention towards some issues, and divert it from others. 
This selective focus can affect how audiences evaluate responsibility (Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 
1982). Politicians set the agenda through speeches, hearings, and reports, which can represent half of 
news stories (Brown et al. 1987, Sigal 1973). This point is important: it is not only what politicians 
say, but also what they do that has an impact on the conversation. Politicians are event-promoters 
(Molotch and Lester 1974). This implies that actors can play the blame game directly through voice, 
and indirectly through action. I will capture both. I hypothesize that peaks of blame will correspond to 
events initiated by the political sphere.  
Second, politicians can shape the framing of the conversation, namely how events are 
discussed (McCombs and Shaw 1993:62). While this interpretive capacity ultimately belongs to 
journalists, politicians are likely to have a major influence. It is important here to understand what is at 
stake.  Accusatory frames rely on an active construction of both causality and moral wrongfulness.  
Moral cues might matter even more than causality in a context of high uncertainty (see Tversky and 
Kahneman 1973). Bankers’ greed might be easier to evaluate than their abuse of derivatives, and 
easier to ground in preexisting “fat cats” rhetoric. A frame must be grounded in words and images that 
are noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged to resonate (Entman 2003). This 
rhetoric can have a very strong impact. The literature on disasters shows that an actor gets blamed if 
s/he adopts a self-serving behavior after a disaster (Bucher 1957, Drabek and Quarantelli 1967, Form 
and Nosow 1958). But contrary to this literature, I argue that self-serving behaviors are themselves 
constructed. Actors can use others’ mistakes to win the blame game. Politicians can activate scandals. 
I hypothesize that scandals will have a major effect in orienting blame.  
Third, politicians can influence the timing of the public conversation. Arguably, the timing 
politicians choose to use speeches, hearings and reports matters. As (Entman 2004) suggested, initial 
frames will tend to discard disconfirming information in the future. Acting first, and acting efficiently, 
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matters in a blame game. I will therefore pay particular attention to the months following the 
September 2008 panic. Politicians could then deploy their full leading power in their dance with 
journalists. Power here rests on the material, institutional, rhetoric and status resources that actors can 
deploy to orient the public discourse. It is politicians’ role and interest to play the blame game visibly. 
Their reputation is crucial, since they need to get elected. While business actors might not be heard 
much in the media, they can influence the debate through lobbying. They do not have the institutional, 
rhetoric and status resources politicians have. Their different resources, role and interest explain their 
logic of action. The blame game is also played invisibly. I hypothesize that business actors will 
intensify their lobbying effort over time. 
To summarize, my goal is to build a theory of blame games, and their effect on the social 
order. The cornerstone of my theory is that politicians can push a dominant frame assigning 
responsibility in such a way as to maintain their power, and re-establish the social order. I draw 
several hypotheses from all the research detailed above.  First, I hypothesize that the financial 
meltdown will lead to an explosion of the blame game, which will radicalize along political 
affiliations. The meltdown could be associated with dense and stable matrices of blame. I cannot 
exclude that the meltdown will lead to a “cosmology episode,” associated with sparse and unstable 
matrices of blame. In either case, I expect to observe at least three stages: unawareness, distress, and 
settlement.  
Second, I posit that the November 2008 election will help Democrats impose their narrative. 
Their narrative might focus on their political opponents and targets of change. Their narrative could 
find a wide echo if they do not face a strong opposition from Republicans. Third, I hypothesize that 
peaks of blame could correspond to events that the political sphere initiated, such as public debates, 
congressional hearings, but also scandals. These events could help point to the past (and present) 
failures of the groups targeted, and notably business actors. Fourth, I hypothesize that business actors 
will respond by intensifying their lobbying efforts. These power games can help explain the dynamic 
construction of culpability and non-culpability as the crisis unfolds. 
 
Research design  
 
To capture blaming incidences, I analyzed three national newspapers from August 2007 to June 2010. 
The newspapers that I selected are The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, and USA Today. The 
rationale behind this selection is threefold. First, they are the three main national newspapers in terms 
of circulation in the United States.  Second, the three newspapers cover the social spectrum from elite 
to mass/popular. Third, the three newspapers cover the political spectrum: from the liberal New York 
Times, to the centrist USA Today, to the conservative Wall Street Journal (Gentzkow and Shapiro 
2010, Groseclose and Milyo 2005).2 Since I am interested in long term processes of sense making, I 
start my analysis when the first warning signs of the crisis emerged. The first striking event that 
signals the beginning of troubles in the financial markets happens on July 31st 2007, when Bear 
Stearns decides to liquidate two internal hedge funds that invested heavily in mortgage-backed 
securities. I end my analysis in June 2010, two months after the S.E.C. announced it was suing 
Goldman Sachs for fraud. The choice of the end date was determined empirically. As the analysis will 
show, the event helps find a temporary closure in the crisis narrative.   
I used Lexisnexis and Factiva to perform queries on all articles that appeared in these three 
newspapers in the years of study. The aim was to select articles that contained at least one blaming 
instance related to the crisis. To this end, I used a set of search terms related to the crisis and to 
causality / blame that resulted in a population of 2,096 articles. In the 2,096 articles I detected a total 
of 5,712 blaming incidences, which averages to 2.76 blaming incidences per article. I identified 2,595 
blaming incidences in The New York Times, 2,252 in The Wall Street Journal and 865 in USA Today. 
These articles were then coded and blaming incidences were identified. The identification of a 
                                                     
2 Actually Groseclose and Milyo’ study (2005) found that the Wall Street Journal was liberal. They attribute it to the fact that 
they did not include editorials, and cite evidence of the separation between liberal news pages and conservative editorials. 
I included the editorials, and letters to the editor, so I still maintain it as conservative.  
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blaming pattern required the presence of 1) an actor, 2) a causal link, and 3) negative consequences 
related to the crisis. An example of a sentence containing a blaming instance would be the following: 
“Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala. [Actor] (…) said the Fed [Actor] ‘kept interest rates too low for too long 
[Causal link], encouraging a housing bubble and excessive risk taking [Negative consequences]’.” 
(USA Today, 12/2009). In this case, Shelby explicitly relates the crisis to the Fed’s actions. As a 
general rule the coding excluded attributions that targeted either mechanisms (“derivatives”, 
“securitization”) or abstract entities (“capitalism”, “American culture”). Details and other examples of 
coding can be found in the appendix. 
The wide diversity of sources and targets of blame were then regrouped in seven master 
categories and 30 sub-categories. The categories represent the field, which the actors belong to. Table 
1 shows how I built the categories. My approach to the study of blame differs from the approach taken 
by political scientists, who mostly rely on surveys, and psychologists, who mostly rely on one-shot lab 
experiment. My method captures a whole ecology of discourses, and their dynamic interplay. My 
method can also grasp any subtle difference in attribution logics. A Democrat congressman and a 
Democrat President might attribute responsibility differently, even though they belong to the same 
party. I posit that an actor’s structural position determines the salience of targets of blame, in a move 
that is both strategic and cognitive.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The first category, Government, represents all the actors of the political sphere, at a local and national 
level. Sometimes the political sphere as a whole is targeted, which led me to create the sub-category 
“Washington.” The sub-category “other (Government)” represents an aggregate of think tanks, of 
States or cities, and of independent politicians, such as Bernie Sanders. The second category, finance, 
is an aggregation of all the actors of the financial sphere, including credit rating agencies. Again, 
sometimes the financial sphere as a whole is targeted, which led me to create the sub-category “Wall 
Street.” The subcategory “other (finance)” represents a miscellaneous aggregate of financial 
consulting firms, auditing firms, and financial analysts.  
The third category, intellectuals, regroups journalists and academics, as well as independent 
book writers and filmmakers. The fourth category, housing, represents all the actors of the mortgage 
lending industry, including non-bank lenders, brokers, appraisers, home developers. The fifth category 
represents the borrowers and consumer advocates, who speak in their name. The last category is the 
general public composed of anonymous letter writers, opinion polls, or unattributed incidences of 
blame (“Wall Street has been abundantly blamed for the crisis” could be example of the later). Finally, 
a last category named “other” represents a miscellaneous aggregate of politicians from other nations, 
the business world, unions and fuzzy abstraction such as “the business elite.”  
I had to make some coding decisions regarding some actors whose category could be 
ambivalent. Some actors, such as banks, are sometimes targeted both as lenders and as securitizers. 
The rationale for accusing them is not always mentioned. I chose to include them in the financial 
sphere, as they are portrayed more as financial institutions.  As a general rule, I kept actors in the 
category, which defines why they are being blamed. For instance former regulators such as Greenspan 
were maintained in this category, although Greenspan became an economic consultant after he left the 
Fed in 2006.  Former members of the Bush administration such as Hank Paulson were similarly 
maintained in this category, although Paulson became a visiting fellow and research associate at 
various American universities after January 2009.   
Three actors change categories over time, because they joined the Obama Administration in 
January 2009, and are targeted in its name: Timothy Geithner (initially, Government / Regulators); 
Hillary Clinton (initially, Government / Democrats); and Larry Summers (initially, Intellectuals / 
Academia). These changes do not affect the result, as the three of them almost stop blaming after they 
join the Obama administration. One exception to this rule is Obama and his administration. Owing to 
the prominent role he assumes, I chose to maintain him in a separate category from the outset.    
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Results 
 
My ambition is to understand blame games and their effect on the social order. There are two parts to 
my analysis. I analyze what happened and how it happened. I first expose the progressive 
crystallization of blame on Wall Street. I then relate it to the Democrats’ landslide win in November 
2008, to the bonus controversy of the winter of 2008, and to actors’ uneven capacity to shape the 
public discourse. 
 
Naming the crisis, naming the witch 
 
Four time periods: unawareness, turmoil, stabilization, settlement 
 
I start the analysis by decomposing the crisis into four temporal periods: the pre-blame game (until 
August 2008), the heat of the blame game (September 2008 – March 2009), the stabilization era (April 
2009 – March 2010), the temporary settlement from April 2010 on. The decomposition is based on 
extensive content analysis, and on the quantitative analyses presented below. I illustrate the framing of 
each period with a quote from either journalists or letter writers. Journalists make sense of public 
discourse, both directly in their articles, and indirectly in their choice of letters to publish. I also track 
the intertwined definitions of the crisis and of responsibilities. I decomposed each era’s targets of 
blame (Figure 1), and dominant definition of the crisis (Table 2). I systematically retrieved the word 
immediately preceding the word “crisis” in my corpus of articles. Table 2 shows the difference in 
probability between its occurrence in each time period and in the whole corpus (for the top 10 words 
per period).3   
 
Figure 1 and Table 2 about here 
 
In period 1, the crisis is defined as a mortgage crisis. Table 2 exposes that the lexicon related to 
mortgage, housing, or foreclosures predominates. It explains that blame is spread between the political 
sphere (29%), the housing industry (26%), the financial industry (37%), and borrowers (7%) (Figure 
1). These actors are all present in this quote from The New York Times from December 2007: “By 
some estimates, up to five million Americans might lose their homes through foreclosures, unable to 
pay off loans in what is known as the subprime mortgage crisis. There was plenty of blame to go 
around for the disaster: predatory activities by lenders, wishful thinking by borrowers, lack of due 
diligence by banks and inadequate oversight by the government.”4  The use of the expression “what is 
known as the subprime mortgage crisis” shows that the crisis has not been fully recognized as such 
yet. The magnitude of the crisis is also widely underestimated: not five, but thirteen million Americans 
were threatened by foreclosures by 2010 (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, 2011:23). 
A general unawareness of the extent of the catastrophe prevails.  
The explosion of the financial system in September 2008 redefines the crisis as a financial 
crisis. Table 2 shows that the lexicon related to finance, banking, credit, or to the economy 
predominates in period 2. The crisis also does not really need to be defined any longer. The words 
“the”, “this”, “current” expose this tacit understanding of the major crisis at stake. A crisis understood 
as minor is redefined as major, leading to the emergence of unsettled times. Anxiety over the event 
leads to frenzied searches for guilt. Blame is both widely diluted and concentrated in the financial and 
political spheres, as this quote from USA Today from December 2008 shows: “Responsibility for the 
financial meltdown is so widespread that there's plenty of culpability to go around. But as a holiday 
season service, I offer these suggestions of those most deserving of coal in their stockings [followed 
                                                     
3 The measure is imperfect, because there are other ways of naming the crisis (“great recession”, “financial meltdown”, 
“economic debacle”, to name a few). However it captures well the reframing of the crisis from a minor mortgage debacle 
to a major financial meltdown. 
4 Source: “Disasters, Natural And Not,” The New York Times, December 31st 2007 
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by a long list of potential culprits, in this order and in these terms: 1/ Investment banks, 2/ Alan 
Greenspan, 3/ Rating agencies, 4/ Predatory lenders, 5/ Clueless borrowers, 6/ Congress, 7/ George W. 
Bush, 8/ Bill Clinton, 9/ Regulators].”5 This type of article, which tries to cast a wide net of blame, is 
typical of this time period. Blame is both wide-spread, and concentrated in the financial and political 
spheres (39% and 46% respectively in Figure 1). 
The third period opens a period of stabilization. It is time for calmer reflections on the causes 
of the crisis. Attention is focused on the connection between regulatory failures and excesses in the 
financial industry, as this quote from The New York Times letters from October 2009 illustrates: “The 
economic debacle on Wall Street was fueled by an intellectually and morally bankrupt administration 
that (as once and future partners of those involved in the chase for unlimited bounty) allowed lack of 
regulation and lax enforcement to create an environment where unchecked greed was not only made 
possible but was also encouraged.”6 The framing of the crisis as an economic debacle on Wall Street 
draws the attention to the connection between Wall Street and Washington, which are defined as “once 
and future partners.” Figure 1 shows that blame is split between the financial and political spheres 
(44% and 40% respectively). Washington is responsible for having created an environment propitious 
to excessive risk-taking. It is arduous to disentangle the responsibility of each actor. This third period 
is characterized by calls for accountability, and calls for prosecution of the parties responsible for the 
crisis.  
The calls for prosecution find an echo in April 2010, when the S.E.C. sues Goldman Sachs for 
fraud. The S.E.C. accuses Goldman Sachs of having failed to disclose vital information to investors in 
one of its “Abacus” mortgage-backed CDOs in 2007. Most people do not remember this event. There 
is a clear disproportion between its importance – one lawsuit among many others – and its echo in the 
media. However, as I will explain throughout this article, the lawsuit proves crucial in the reaching of 
a temporary settlement. The financial sphere receives 64% of the blame – way ahead of the political 
sphere (Figure 1).  The change is quantitative and qualitative. The characterization of Wall Street’s 
behavior moves from merely immoral to illegal. The ever-wider share of blame attributed to the 
financial sphere from period 2 to 4 is reflected in the increasing definition of the crisis as a financial 
crisis. Table 2 shows that the difference in probability for the word “finance” soars from period 2 
(0.33) to period 4 (0.5).  
A quote from The Wall Street Journal’s letters exemplifies how the crisis is attached to Wall 
Street’s behavior: “Wall Street has become a popular target in Washington, and why not? From Main 
Street's perspective, Wall Street caused the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. From 
Main Street's view, our economy was doing just fine until those rich bankers' credit default swaps and 
mortgage-backed securities caused the near collapse of my financial system.”7 The letter writer notes 
the symbolic gap between Main Street and Wall Street, which is unfairly reinforced by Washington. 
The appearance of the words “recent” or “next” in Table 2 confirms that the symbolic outcasting of 
Wall Street opens the path for a settlement. The worst recession in the last 80 years, second only to the 
Great Depression, is now recent History. Commentators are already considering the next potential 
crisis. 
Overall I observe a classic stage model of sense making.  The initial period of unawareness is 
followed by periods of turmoil, stabilization, and settlement. The crisis moves from being defined as a 
minor mortgage crisis to a major financial crisis, which causes the worst recession in the last 80 years. 
This redefinition of the crisis echoes the ever-wider share of blame taken by the financial sphere. 
Figure 1 shows that the increasing culpability of Wall Street goes along with the decreasing culpability 
of other actors: the housing industry and borrowers after period 1, and the political sphere after period 
3. The identification of a main culprit results from a process of culpabilization and de-culpabilization.  
 
                                                     
5 Source: “Who's to Blame for Economy?,” USA Today, December 17th 2008 
6 Letters to the Editor, The New York Times, October 19th 2009 
7 Letters to the Editor, The Wall Street Journal, May 27th 2010 
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Blame and Uncertainty 
 
I conducted additional analyses to confirm this temporal decomposition, and to test several hypotheses 
related to blame dynamics in unsettled times. I hypothesized that unsettled times should be associated 
with dense and stable matrices of blame.  
To assess stability, I measured the correlations between monthly matrices of raw blaming 
counts using the Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) (Figure 2). The matrices connected sources 
and targets of blame at the level of the 30 sub-categories (see Table 1). QAP calculates the association 
between the relations represented in two matrices, and then uses quadratic assignment procedures to 
compute the standard errors. I use the resulting matrix to formally detect (temporal) clusters of similar 
blaming incidences.8 Figure 2 shows that until the financial system explodes in September 2008, the 
correlation between matrices is low, with a mean at 0.38. From September 2008 to March 2010 
matrices become more highly correlated, the mean coefficient reaching 0.48 in period 2, and 0.47 in 
period 3. It means that overall actors blame more consistently. From April 2010 on, we see another 
shift. Network structures for the three last months are highly correlated with each other (with a 0.64 
mean coefficient), but lowly correlated with the rest of the period. A new era of blame is starting. The 
analysis confirms that unsettled times begin in September 2008. It also confirms the importance 
played by the S.E.C. lawsuit.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
It might seem counter-intuitive that blaming patterns would be more correlated during unsettled times. 
One might expect them to be more chaotic. This expectation relates to another measure. The scope of 
blame is broader during periods of turmoil. Figure 3 exposes the cumulative share of blame of the top 
20 targets, and corresponding Theil index of each period. As a representation in terms of cumulative 
proportions per quantiles is widely used in social inequality research, I also computed the Theil index 
for each time period. The Theil index measures the inequality within and between differently defined 
population subgroups. It is more relevant to my analysis than a Gini index, which does not include the 
inequality between subgroups. 
I observe a movement of opening and closure of the scope of blame. When the financial 
system explodes in period 2, the scope of potential culprits widens. The Theil index drops from 0.61 in 
period 1 to 0.26 in period 2. However during the next two periods, the distribution of blame becomes 
much more uneven. The Theil index moves from 0.55 in period 3 to 0.81 in period 4. 9  A main culprit 
has been identified. Banks cumulate 38% of the blame in period 4. However it is puzzling to see that 
regulators were the main target in period 3. Interestingly, the Bush administration is never the main 
target (and actually never appears in the top three). Bush will not become the Hoover of the Great 
Recession. 
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
To assess intensity, I measured the evolution of the number of blaming instances per month (Figure 4). 
It shows that as predicted blame is more intense from September 2008 on. There are three major 
                                                     
8 The model is based on simulation and allows for the detection of communities in valued graphs by running a version of the 
Spinglass community detection algorithm. More specifically, the method implies three steps. First I calculated the 
observed correlation. Second, for K iterations (set at 500 in this case), I randomly sorted one of the matrices, and 
recalculated the correlation. Third I compared the observed correlations to the distribution of correlations created by the 
random permutations. The cells of the matrix contain the differences between the correlation of the observed and the 
mean of the correlations between the random matrices. 
9 The ordering of the Lorenz curves of each time period is unambiguous. It shows an indisputable dominance of the one of 
the fourth period, which never crosses the others. The Theil index is more appropriate in this case, but another measure of 
disparity would not change the results fundamentally.  
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peaks: September-October 2008, February-March 2009 and April 2010. Content analysis reveals that, 
as predicted, the most important peaks correspond to events initiated by the political sphere. The first 
peak mostly corresponds to the controversy around the $700 billion bailout plan to rescue the financial 
industry passed by Congress on October 3rd. The second peak is mostly triggered by two events: the 
controversies over the bonus and the stimulus package. A report released by the New York State 
comptroller in December 2008 starts the uproar. Although bonuses are 44% lower than their 2007 
level, they are still comparable to the 2004 bonuses, while Wall Street was just saved by the 
government. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, a $787 billion stimulus package signed 
into law on February 17th 2009, also triggers intense debates on State intervention in the economy. 
Times are then calmer, opening the period of stabilization. The third peak mostly corresponds to the 
S.E.C. versus Goldman Sachs lawsuit.  
 
Figure 4 about here 
 
I summarized the main findings of this first part in Table 3 for clarity’s sake. It illustrates the dynamic 
interplay between the framing of the crisis and the framing of responsibilities. The crisis is 
increasingly defined as a financial crisis, and Wall Street takes an ever wider share of blame. However 
frames do not emerge in a vacuum. They are actively pushed by actors engaged in an uneven power 
game. The association between peaks of blame and political events is a first indication of the power of 
the political sphere. I will detail how this power manifests itself both directly and indirectly in the 
second section.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
A hyper-concentration driven by the political sphere 
 
The Democrats’ landslide win in 2008 shifts the balance of power in the blame game. The political 
sphere can orient what, how, and when events are discussed. Democrats control the floor, and set the 
tone of the conversation, by using the other party’s mistakes. I disentangle several factors behind the 
dynamic framing of the crisis: first, the November 2008 election; second, the bonus scandal in the 
winter of 2008; third, the role of the S.E.C. versus Goldman Sachs trial; fourth, the uneven distribution 
of voices in the media. 
 
The rise of the Democrats  
 
A major event happens in November 4th 2008: Obama is elected President of the United States, and the 
Democratic Party increases its majority in both chambers of the Congress.  The influence of the 
Democrats in the media increases dramatically after the election. This shift helps explain the 
increasing focus on Wall Street. I demonstrate this point by measuring both the intensity and 
composition of the blaming incidences of both camps over the four time periods. Figure 5 represents 
the number of blaming instances by the political camp over the four time periods. Table 4 decomposes 
the top six blaming targets of the Democrat and Republican camps over the four time periods. 
 
Figure 5 and Table 4 about here 
 
Democrats strongly dominate the blame game after they seize power. Figure 5 shows that the ratio of 
blaming incidences sent by Democrats versus Republicans soars dramatically after the second period. 
It represents three-quarters in the third period, and almost two-fifths in the fourth period. It can be 
explained by four factors. First it reflects the hierarchy of news sources established in Gans’ classical 
study (1979): the President followed by national politicians dominate the news. Logically elections 
have an impact on the hierarchies of news sources. Second it echoes the “honeymoon period” that 
follows any presidential election, coined “Obama mania”. Thirdly it reflects Democrats’ higher moral 
ground: they were not in power during the eight years that preceded the crisis. Table 4 shows that once 
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the Presidential campaign is over, Democrats shift their story. They stop blaming the Bush 
administration or Republicans. They do not play the traditional Washington blame game any longer. 
This is very surprising, since blaming the previous administration is a classic political strategy to 
justify difficult decisions. 
It can be explained in three ways. First, it corresponds to Obama’s initial philosophy of 
reconciliation. This implies reaching out beyond his political camp. Second, this shift can be 
interpreted as a response to the threat of the Tea Party movement. The movement emerged in February 
2009 as a reaction to the bailouts and stimulus package. Blaming Republicans could strengthen the 
libertarian movement, and complicate negotiation processes. Third, Obama announces major reforms 
of banking regulation in June 2009. To support this move, in period 3 Democrats heavily blame the 
targets of change: the financial industry (24% for Wall Street and 31% for banks) and regulators 
(29%).  But in period 4, they focus more explicitly on the financial industry (41% for Wall Street and 
33% for banks), which is resisting the proposed changes. Regulators only represent 8% of the blame 
within the top six targets. Democrats switch targets depending on their agenda.  
Table 4 shows that at the beginning, Republicans focus their attention on Wall Street (27%) 
and Mortgage Lenders (50%). It is rather logical that the political party in power for the eight years 
prior to the crisis tries to deflect blame outside of the political arena. In period 2, they spread the 
blame widely. They focus on Wall Street’s recklessness (32%), and on the homeownership policy, 
promoted by Democrats through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (18%). Republicans’ targets of blame 
change in periods 3 and 4. They focus their attention on the role of State intervention in the economy, 
embodied by regulators (54%) in period 3, and by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (71%) in period 4.  
Republicans try to shift back the story to the mortgage roots of the crisis, which could be more 
favorable to them. But again, Republicans are not only trying to differentiate themselves ideologically. 
The fact that they stop targeting the financial industry has to be connected to lobbying efforts.  While 
the financial industry supported Democrats in 2008, it switched back to supporting its traditional 
Republican ally in 2009. As expected, it also heavily intensified its lobbying efforts. Between 2006 
and 2010, the amount of money the financial / insurance / real estate industry spent on lobbying 
increased by 26.5%.10 The increase is particularly impressive in dire economic times. Republicans do 
not blame their supporters – but do not go as far as defending them either. Coalitions between Wall 
Street and politicians changed over time, partly explaining the evolution of the blame game.  
 
The crucial moment 
 
One might argue that the financial meltdown in September 2008 changed the nature of the crisis itself, 
from a mortgage to a financial crisis. This explanation would then reduce the switch in dominant 
narratives to “objective” facts, rather than to the power of the Democrats. The chronology of events 
offers the possibility to assess more clearly the role played by the election. The election happened on 
November 4th, while the financial system crumbled from September 2008 on. I split period 2 into a 
period 2a (September 1st – November 3rd) and 2b (November 4th – March 31st). This period is crucial 
as initial frames are rarely disconfirmed (Entman 2004). Figure 6 decomposes the number of blaming 
instances of each political camp. Table 5 decomposes the top 6 targets of the whole dataset (including 
Democrats and Republicans). I choose here a more fine-grained level of analysis than in Figure 1. My 
goal is to capture the subtle influence of Republicans’ frame rather than provide a big picture of the 
dynamic framing of the crisis. 
 
Figure 6 and Table 5 about here 
 
Figure 6 shows that Republicans slightly dominate until they lose the election. Then they abruptly stop 
being heard. In line with indexing theory (Bennett 1990), their narrative loses ground in the media. 
Open disagreement between political camps determines whether the media diverges from the ruling 
government line. Table 5 exposes that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which gathered 14% of the blame 
                                                     
10 Source: Center for Responsive Politics. Website: http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indus.php?id=F.   
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in period 2a, disappear from the top 6 in period 2b. The institutions, which Republican Presidential 
candidate McCain claimed were the match that started the fire, actually rank 13th. Table 5 also shows 
that the Bush administration’s blame share drops from 18% to 11% of the top 6. Its decisions to let 
Lehman fail, to generously save Wall Street, and to neglect the housing crisis could have been widely 
criticized. Bush’s fate might be the best indicator of  the Democrats’ influence on the public discourse. 
The Wall Street Journal editorialists are fully aware of the turn towards the Democrats’ narrative, 
when they write right before the election: “Derivatives are the irresistible story now, because they 
offer the opportunity to shift the blame from bad housing policy and they suggest that a lack of 
financial regulation was the problem.”11  Both the Democrats’ election, and the Republicans’ silence, 
will amplify this move. 
The more Democrats push the excessive market narrative, the more Republicans try to push an 
excessive State counter-narrative. The Republicans’ narrative does not stick – partly because they do 
not have as much power to impose it, and partly because their narrative does not resonate with the 
public anger directed at Wall Street after the bonus controversy. The bonus controversy is a key 
weapon for the Democrats. In a blame game, the accuser can use the accused’s mistakes to win 
audiences’ approval.  
 
The bonus controversy 
 
As stated earlier, a report released by the New York State comptroller in December 2008 started the 
uproar. The total amount of bonuses on Wall Street for 2008 amounts to $18.4 billion, which was then 
the sixth largest round of bonuses on record. The public uproar is striking if we compare it to the 
relative indifference given to the exit-pay package that S. O’Neal received only a year earlier. He 
received the fifth-largest exit-pay package for a U.S. executive ($161.5 million) when he left a 
bleeding Merrill Lynch. Democrats actively used the distribution of bonuses to push their legislative 
agenda.  
At a time when news commentators seem unaware of the looming problem, New York State 
Attorney General A. Cuomo demands that A.I.G.'s directors take steps to claw back payments in mid-
October 2008. Bonuses then become a center of focus in Washington. On January 29th 2009, Obama 
accuses Wall Street banks of displaying “the height of irresponsibility” and of letting down the 
American people. In the same vein, on February 11th Wall Street banks’ CEOs confront a hostile 
congressional committee. In March, the House of Representatives votes in favor of a bill to levy a 
90% tax on big bonuses from firms bailed out by taxpayers (which will never be implemented). The 
pressure intensifies as the year goes by. On December 13th, Obama declares: “I did not run for office 
to be helping out a bunch of fat cat bankers on Wall Street.”12 He then proposes a “financial crisis 
responsibility fee” on January 14th 2010, as well as restrictions on proprietary trading. Strikingly these 
proposals happen the day after the first Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission hearings on January 13th. 
The Democrat-dominated commission chooses to call to account Wall Street banks’ CEOs first. The 
order and timing of witness appearances is crucial in the public discourse battle. The new financial 
regulations will be signed into law in July.  
The bonus controversy plays a crucial role in opening a symbolic gap between “Wall Street” 
and “Main Street.” Entman (2003) shows that a frame must be packaged in words and images that are 
noticeable, understandable, memorable, and emotionally charged to resonate with a wider audience. 
Bonuses are a sign that bankers gamed the system to their benefit – and to everybody else’s loss. An 
excerpt from The New York Times from January 200913 captures the idea well: “But words like ‘off-
balance-sheet vehicles’ and ‘mortgage-backed securities’ don't have much meaning for most of us. 
What we understand is greed. For most Americans, big bonuses and corporate jets and office 
remodelings become a kind of stand-in for the real sins of the bankers.” In a high uncertainty context, 
                                                     
11 Source: “Barack Wrote a Letter...,” The Wall Street Journal, October 29th 2008  
12 Source: “Obama Slams 'Fat Cat' Bankers,” The Wall Street Journal, December 14th 2009 
13 Source: “It's Not the Bonus Money. It's the Principle,” The New York Times, January 31st 2009 
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causality is constructed by using the heuristic tool of “following the money.” Bonuses anchor both 
causality and moral wrongfulness, and trigger a strong emotional reaction.  
The symbolic gap will be reinforced by the discrepancy between Wall Street’s fast recovery 
and Main Street’s slow recovery in 2009 and 2010. Though a large number of banks failed or nearly 
failed during the crisis, on the whole they recovered quickly. The total financial sector profits reached 
$428 billion in 2006, and then dropped to $128 billion in 2008. But they bounced back to $242 billion 
in 2009 and $369 billion in 2010, thanks to low interest rates and low-cost government borrowing 
(The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011:401). This fast recovery while the overall economy 
struggled creates a “war profiteer” syndrome. Wall Street banks CEOs lobbying and communication 
efforts also have disastrous effects.  The latter probably culminated in November 2009 when Goldman 
Sachs CEO claimed that he refused to put a cap on bonus and ambition, because banks were merely 
“doing God’s work.”14 The chieftains of Wall Street present an attitude that appears arrogant and self-
serving. 
The bonus controversy anchors the image of a self-serving banker, reinforced by good 
financial results and resistance to change. The comparison with the previous year shows that a 
different context redefines these compensation practices as deviant. As J. Dimon, CEO of J.P. Morgan 
says the bailout has become a “Scarlet letter.”15 Self-serving behavior triggers blame, in line with 
disaster theories. My analysis pushes this literature further. It shows that Democrats promote this self-
serving image. Journalists overwhelmingly concur with politicians’ narrative, although they 
sometimes regret that politicians’ “headline obsession with bonuses”16 prevents deeper reflections on 
the crisis triggering mechanisms. 
 
Tests and spillover effects 
 
The lead taken by Democrats, and the bonus controversy, help explain how blame shifted towards 
Wall Street. But they do not explain the final hyper-concentration on Wall Street’s responsibility. 
They neither explain the importance taken by the S.E.C. lawsuit in April 2010, nor the decrease in 
regulators’ responsibility either.  The explanation is again to be found in the power of the political 
sphere. The political sphere can promote events. Events act like tests which can have a massive 
spillover effect. 
The S.E.C. investigation appears at a point when attention is already centered on Goldman 
Sachs. The bonus outcry culminates in March 2009. It is announced that A.I.G. has crashed to become 
the biggest corporate loss in US history, and paid out a total of $218 million in bonuses after accepting 
bailout cash. A.I.G. top executives receive death threats. The outcry decreases after April 2009, in the 
stabilization era. But a new villain clearly emerges: Goldman Sachs. Figure 7 computes the number of 
times Goldman Sachs is mentioned per period. The mentions almost double from one period to the 
other. Goldman Sachs increasingly becomes the focus of attention. The magazine Rolling Stone 
publishes a well-known article about Goldman Sachs in July 2009, accusing it of being “a great 
vampire squid wrapped around the face of humanity.”17  The reason why the attention drifts towards 
Goldman Sachs is that it appears the greatest war profiteer in this crisis. Contrary to A.I.G., Goldman 
Sachs posted a $13.4 billion profit in 2009, a Wall Street record.  
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
                                                     
14 Source: “Blankfein Says He is Just Doing God’s Work,” The New York Times, November 9th 2009 
15 Source: “Goldman Is Feeling Unloved,” The New York Times, April 17th 2009  
16 Source: “We Can't Subsidize the Banks Forever,” The Wall Street Journal, May 5th 2009 
17 Source: “The Great American Bubble Machine,” Rolling Stone, July 13th 2009. One might wonder if this article is not key 
in switching the attention towards Goldman Sachs. This explanation is insufficient because Goldman Sachs starts being a 
central focus in April 2009, three months before its publication. 
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A frame is set which explains the echo of the S.E.C. versus Goldman Sachs lawsuit. An agent carrying 
the legitimacy of the State accuses the world’s most prestigious bank of illegal rather than simply 
immoral behavior.  The prosecution has a spillover effect: Goldman Sachs’ behavior is taken as 
representative of Wall Street’s. The lawsuit helps find closure in the narrative, by asserting the 
violation of community standards. It is interesting to note that a regulator voices the accusation. The 
S.E.C. is seen as regaining strength through the accusation, after having been asleep at the wheel for 
too long. It is also interesting to note that the spillover effect happens three months before the 
signature of the Dodd-Frank regulatory package. Reputation can help regulation. 
This spillover effect is striking because in period 3 regulators were still the main accused. 
Many potential tests, and notably B. Bernanke’s confirmation in January 2010, could have had a large 
spillover effect. But I observe a movement of de-culpabilization of regulators. They are still distrusted 
for failing to anticipate the crisis, and failing to regulate mortgage and financial institutions 
appropriately. But their reaction to the disaster is perceived adequate. B. Bernanke in particular is seen 
as the expert of the Great Depression who saved the economy. This quote from a July 2009 op-ed 
from from N. Roubini, one of the few economists who predicted the explosion of the bubble, 
illustrates this point: “Mr. Bernanke deserves to be reappointed. Both the conventional and 
unconventional decisions made by this scholar of the Great Depression prevented the Great Recession 
of 2008-2009 from turning into the Great Depression 2.0.”18  Bernanke is perceived as the expert who 
saved the economy. His academic background and lack of connection to Wall Street help this 
transformation. His confirmation will finalize this movement of de-culpabilization, and prevent a 
spillover effect on regulators as a whole 
Again though, frames do not emerge in a vacuum. They have to be related to wider power 
games between accusers, accused and audiences. Powerful accusers do not have a strong interest in 
heavily blaming regulators. The Obama administration supports B. Bernanke’s confirmation. B. 
Bernanke himself revealed an unexpected political genius during the crisis. His open and humble 
communication style markedly differs from the abstruse and laconic style of his predecessor, A. 
Greenspan. He regularly discusses his policy in public meetings. He walks along Main Street in his 
home town in CBS’ 60 minutes in March 2009. When powerful actors do not back the accusations, 
and when the accused deploy adequate strategies, journalists endorse the accusation timidly. Strikingly 
journalists mostly use the passive form to blame regulators. The category “unknown” is most often 
used to blame regulators across time periods. The decomposition of the top 10 targets of blame of this 
“unknown” category is telling. Regulators represent 29% of the top 10 in period 1, 18% in period 2, 
37% in period 3, and 19% in period 4. The category unknown is the regulators’ main accuser in period 
3. More importantly narratives on regulators convey a story of mistakes rather than misconduct. Their 
behavior is not perceived to be self-serving.  
During unsettled times any event could become an important catalyst of blame. During these 
events, blame can have a contagious effect. Blaming a part can lead to blaming the whole. A 
prosecution against Goldman Sachs anchors the principle of Wall Street’s responsibility. Conversely, a 
belonging to a whole grounds (or prevents) the blame to the part. Bernanke’s affiliation to academia 
(and not to Wall Street) is underlined to anchor his image of “Great Preventer.” 
 
An imbalance of power 
 
This active construction of events might not have happened so forcefully if the power to shape the 
public discourse was evenly distributed. I represent what I called the field of accusation in Figures 8 
and 9. These matrices connect the accusers and the accused by field, period by period (Figure 8) or 
during the whole crisis (Figure 9).  
The figures show that business actors, be they in the financial or mortgage industry, do not 
shape the blame game at any point in time. In Figure 8, the financial industry only sends 499 ties, and 
receives 2323, and the housing industry sends 95 ties, and receives 719. There are in fact three 
categories of actors: the ones who accuse (intellectuals and the general public), the ones who are 
                                                     
18 Source: “Does Bernanke Deserve Another Term?: The Great Preventer,” The New York Times, July 26th 2009 
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accused (finance, housing, and borrowers), and the ones who accuse and are accused (Government). 
Figure 8 also exposes the fact that the categories that receive most of the blame – Government, 
finance, housing – show a very high level of internal blame game. The financial industry 
overwhelmingly blames itself (355 ties out of 499 sent) and so does the housing industry (39 ties out 
of 95 sent). The more a field is under attack, the more actors protect (or further) their own position by 
deflecting blame internally. The blame game reveals and reinforces field logics. Social hierarchies can 
be redefined in these unsettled times, leading to strong rivalries. By enacting these rivalries, actors 
actually reinforce the blame targeted towards their own category, instead of diffusing it externally for 
instance. 
 
Figure 8 (a, b, c, d) about here 
Figure 9 about here 
 
The decomposition of the field of Government exposes how these dynamics work (Figure 10). It 
shows an imbalance of power between accusers and accused within the field. The three biggest targets 
of blame, which are regulators, the Bush administration, and Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac, are not big 
emitters of blame. Regulators send 112 ties and receive 264, the Bush administration sends 23 ties and 
receives 153, and Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac receives sends 12 ties and receives 98. Again they show a 
high level of internal blame game, accounting for around three-quarters of the blame sent by regulators 
and Fannie Mae / Freddie Mac respectively (interestingly though, the Bush administration rarely 
blames itself). Figure 10 shows that the blame game is structured around the traditional oppositions 
between Democrats and Republicans, which was to be expected. Interestingly, the positions of 
Democrats and Republicans in Congress are slightly different from the positions of both Presidents. It 
shows that, as predicted, political ideologies should be crossed with structural positions in analyzing 
blaming incidences. For instance, Obama blames regulators less, but Washington more than 
Democrats do. He assumes the gravitas of a President.  
 
Figure 10 about here 
 
In this section, I have exposed why blame increasingly targeted the financial sphere. The takeover of 
Washington by Democrats coincides with the beginning of the bonus controversy. Democrats 
increasingly insist on Wall Street’s responsibility in order to push legislation in Congress. They surf 
on the deep public anger caused by Wall Street’s past and current behavior. However such a 
crystallization might not have been so stark if voice power had been more evenly distributed in the 
media.  
 
Discussion 
 
This article exposes how a blame game led by the political sphere, and Democrats in particular, led to 
the crystallization of blame on Wall Street. What follows is a description of the contributions, the 
generalizability and limitations of my work.  
The main contribution of this article is to produce a theory of blame games. I have defined 
them as a dynamic process of accusations and counter-accusations.  Blame games are not senseless 
eruptions of anger. They are, rather, structured and dynamic processes of boundary drawing.  The 
soaring culpability of Wall Street goes along a decreasing culpability of borrowers and the housing 
industry first, and of the political sphere second. Blame is shaped by a process of culpabilization and 
de-culpabilization. This process echoes an overall process of sense making. The ongoing reframing of 
the crisis echoes the reframing of responsibilities. The crisis is increasingly defined as a financial 
crisis, as the focus is increasingly on Wall Street. To a cast of possible deeds, there corresponds a cast 
of plausible perpetrators (Tilly 2008). Logical candidates for blame are progressively discarded. But 
this outcome is the result of an active construction of causality and moral wrongfulness.  As Faulkner 
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(Faulkner 2011:16) argues, it is “a virtuoso exercise in the redescription of behavior in order to 
transform its moral significance.” This construction is still anchored in facts and events. The point is 
that some are highlighted more than others. 
Using the concept of blame games helps me build and depart from previous approaches on the 
assignment of responsibility. I go beyond the idea of a “resonance” of frames with a wider context. I 
reconnect accusatory frames to the actors who push them, and re-embed them in a wider field of 
power relations. The success of an accusatory frame depends on the power of the accuser, the 
weakness of the accused, and the acceptance of the audiences. Power here refers to the material, 
institutional, rhetoric and status resources that actors can deploy to orient the public discourse.  One 
might wonder why powerful actors do not simply crush their opponents in a public blame game. The 
Obama administration needs Wall Street to start lending again, and Republicans not to oppose 
regulation. While it has the power to crush other actors, it might be wise not to use it fully. A President 
might also lose his/her gravitas if s/he uses this power too profusely. Actors must find a balance 
between competition and cooperation to further their interests. 
The theory I delineated calls for an examination of its generalizability and limitations. This 
work participates in the understanding of a wide range of disruptive events, from uncoupling to natural 
disasters. Blame games are universal processes that can emerge in many contexts of disputes. My 
study involved the specific case of an immensely complex and system-wide crisis. It has three 
implications. First, a myriad of actors could be deemed responsible. Second, establishing causality, 
and therefore responsibility for the crisis is difficult. Many different interpretations of the crisis could 
be given. I argued that moral wrongfulness matters at least as much as causality in this context. Moral 
wrongfulness defines the line between the “good guys” and the “bad guys.” Third, the crisis had 
repercussions for American society as a whole (and beyond). I think that this led to a particularly 
intense blame game, whose outcome could not be fully predicted ex-ante. Further research is needed 
to validate this assumption though, by comparing this case to others.   
Although my case is specific, I have laid out a model applicable to many different contexts. 
Researchers studying blame games should start by analyzing the logics and means of actions of the 
competing coalitions. This power game can also explain the resonance of a frame with a political and 
historical context. But time continually recomposes both the context and the structure of power 
relations. Powerful actors under fire can see their legitimacy shaking, and lose their capacity to shape 
the public discourse. Revolutions can start with a blame game. The empirical study of blaming 
dynamics uncovers what I call fields of accusation. I have defined them as a public sphere where 
actors compete to assign responsibility, in a game of accusations and counter-accusations. The fields 
vary depending on the scope of the disaster, the harm done, and the investigations conducted. The 
fields are themselves dynamic. Their boundaries can expand (or shrink) as the scandal expands (or 
shrinks).  
There are several limitations to my study. First, it does not take into account other potentially 
related blame games. Republicans have an interest in driving the attention towards other issues, such 
as health care policies. If they don’t like what is being said, they can switch the conversation. Second, 
it captures blame dynamics over a short period of time. The collective memory literature (Giesen 
2016, Levy and Sznaider 2004, Olick 2007, Tsutsui 2009) shows how responsibility assignments 
constantly evolve over time. Responsibility for World War 2 evolved from being hyper-concentrated 
on a few culprits to being hyper-extended to humanity as a whole. It is unclear how blame patterns for 
the crisis will evolve over the long run.  
Third, this study analyzes how actors push frames that overlap in assigning responsibility. 
However two different parties for different reasons can blame the same actor. Democrats and 
Republicans typically disagree on the appropriate level of State intervention in the economy. They 
might both accuse the Fed, for doing too much, or too little to save the economy. An interesting study 
could disentangle the claims behind accusations. It would similarly reconnect them to the actors who 
push them, and study claims’ evolution over time. Such study would try and understand how actors 
themselves conceive the interplay between morals and markets (Fourcade and Healy 2007, Fourcade 
et al. 2013), how they justify their claims, and how their denunciations are received (Boltanski, Darré 
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and Schiltz 1984). This study could illuminate another important factor in explaining the success of an 
accusation: the validity of claims. 
This article deals with reputation rather than regulation. However the discrepancy between the 
frenzied search for guilt and the timid regulations that followed triggers a “so what?” question, both 
empirically and theoretically. I argue that this discrepancy is actually significant. The disaster research 
(Drabek and Quarantelli 1967) shows that the more intense the search for responsible parties, and the 
less the efforts to correct permanent problems. Conversely, the absence of personal blame can lead to 
major structural changes. The absence of major structural change and the intense search for guilt have 
to be read in conjunction. Yet a competing hypothesis could be true. The timid regulations could be 
seen as an effect of a lack of strong involvement of powerful actors. The Democrats’ attacks might 
seem timid in comparison with the violent rhetoric that President Roosevelt and F. Pecora deployed 
during the Great Depression. The crisis might well have been the failed revenge of the Democrats. 
This competing hypothesis points to the role of agents in enacting their environment. Only a 
comparative study could adjudicate between both hypotheses. 
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APPENDIX A: Research protocol 
Conducting this media analysis was a long and thorough process, which took two years. The corpus of 
articles containing blaming patterns represents 10,161 pages of word documents (4,798 for The Wall 
Street Journal, 4,260 for The New York Times, 1,103 for USA Today). 
 
Sampling 
 
I first gathered all the articles containing at least one blaming pattern related to the crisis.  The main 
focus of the article could be the crisis itself, or any other matter. To retrieve the articles, I used search 
words as the lexicon related to causality, responsibility, accountability, and the diverse denominations 
of the financial crisis. The list is the following: 
(Caused or cause or causing or produced or producing or produce or triggered or trigger or 
triggering or induce or induced or inducing or lead to or leading to or led to or mechanism or 
mechanisms or resulting or result or resulted or the heart of or origin or originating or originated or 
contribute or contributing or roots or rooted or provoked or provoking or provoke or precipitate or 
precipitating or precipitated or bring about or brought about or prompting or prompt or prompted or 
sparking or spark or sparked or starting or start or started or deriving or derive or derived or stem or 
stemming or stemmed or fueled by or enable or enabled or enablers or arise or arising or arose or 
emerge or emerging or emerged or failed or failure or failing or reckless or responsible or 
irresponsible or greed or misconduct or cupidity or greedy or predatory or liar's loan or no doc or 
responsibility or blame or blaming or blamed or blamable or guilt or guilty or fault or faulting or faulty 
or imputable or imputation or imputed or imputing or shame or shaming or accusing or accuse or 
accused or accusation or charge or charging or charged or ascribing or ascribe or assign or assigned or 
assigning or culpable or on the hook or reprehensible or complaint or complaining or castigated or 
castigating or criticized or criticizing or denunciating or denunciated disapproving or disapproval or 
implicating or implicated or reproaching or reproached or trespassing or trespass or transgressing or 
transgression or wrongdoing or misconduct or mistake or offense or misuse or attacking or attacked or 
point the finger or prosecuted or prosecuting or recriminated or accountability or accountable or liable 
or liability or answerable or answerability or onus or burden) AND (housing slump or housing bust or 
housing bubble or subprime mortgages or foreclosures or credit crunch or financial crisis or economic 
crisis or great recession or global recession or turmoil or subprime crisis or subprime mortgage crisis 
or crisis) 
 
Coding 
 
I then identified all the blaming incidences in each article. I coded incidences which were related to 
the crisis itself. This coding strategy excluded philosophical discussions on the bailout for instance 
(deemed “un-American” by some). This coding method also excluded discussions about future 
potential consequences (as in the bailout could worsen the situation). This means that I would select a 
sentence where an actor thought that Paulson’s inconsistent bailout proposals did aggravate problems 
on the financial market. I had three coding criteria: An actor (a) a causality link (b) related to the crisis 
(c). I selected instances where an actor thought another actor’s past or present actions had a negative 
and real effect on the crisis. An article could contain multiple incidences of blame, sometimes in the 
same sentence. For each blaming instance, I distinguished a source and a target of blame (actor A 
blames actor B). Finally, both actor A and actor B were positioned in a category and sub-category.  I 
excluded both mechanisms (“derivatives”) and abstractions (“capitalism”) from the coding. What 
follows are several examples and counter-examples of coding.  
The president said the financial crisis, which has cost more than 8 million jobs so far, was 
“born of a failure of responsibility from Wall Street all the way to Washington.” (USA Today, 
04/2010) 
 Obama (Government / Obama administration) >> Wall Street (Finance / Wall Street) 
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 Obama (Government / Obama administration) >> Washington (Government / 
Finance) 
Today, the Bakers owe $30,000 on credit cards and $105,000 on a home worth only $63,000. 
They blame themselves but also say lenders share responsibility for “making it so easy” to borrow. 
(USA Today, 06/2008) 
       The Bakers (Borrowers / Borrowers) >> The Bakers (Borrowers / Borrowers) 
 The Bakers (Borrowers / Borrowers) >> Mortgage lenders (Housing industry / 
Mortgage lenders) 
 
In “Efficient Market Theory and Crisis” (op-ed, Oct. 29), Jeremy J. Siegel convinced me that 
the efficient market hypothesis was a contributing factor to the financial crisis. If the prices of 
securities reflect “all known information that impacts their value,” then why did these prices not 
reflect all the information Mr. Siegel said “should have sent up red flags and cast doubts”? (The Wall 
Street Journal, 11/2009) 
 No blaming tie 
 
As a Republican, Mr. Shelby would normally be the one to defend a Republican president's 
policies. Instead, he's the leader of a mounting chorus of conservatives who think President George W. 
Bush has sold out conservative principles. "I think we're going down the road of France now." (The 
Wall Street Journal, 09/2008) 
        No blaming tie  
 
Inter-reliability coding 
 
To test the robustness of both my categories and my coding, I asked two external coders to analyze a 
random sample of 100 articles. The sample was drawn from the three newspapers in proportion of 
their importance in my population. The coders had to answer the question: who is blaming who for 
negative consequences related to the crisis? I asked the coders to follow the same method I used. First 
they had to identify if and where there was a blaming pattern in the text. Then they had to identify who 
was blaming who. Finally they had to assign categories to the source and the target of blame, at the 
level of a category (“Housing”), and sub-category (“Mortgage lenders”). Intercoder reliability was 
calculated by using Fleiss’s Kappa, which allows for computations for more than two coders. It 
measures the proportion of agreement between raters taking chance into account, and is therefore more 
reliable than simple percent agreement (Kolbe and Burnett 1991, Stemler 2001). It compares observed 
agreement with expected agreement. The metric goes to 1 when coding is perfectly reliable and to -1 
when the observed agreement is lower than the expected value. Fleiss (1981) provides a scale to 
interpret his statistic. A measure below 0.40 indicates poor agreement; a measure between 0.60 and 
0.74, shows an intermediate to good agreement; a measure above 0.75 means that the agreement is 
excellent. Among the 296 blaming incidences identified in common, the agreement at the level of the 
identification of an actor with a category was of 0.88, and the agreement at the level of the 
identification of an actor with a sub-category was 0.67. I am therefore confident that my method is 
robust, and preserves the richness of the analysis.  
 
Community detection analysis 
 
The rationale for using pre-defined clusters instead of grouping actors on the basis of a community 
detection analysis is three-fold. First, the number of individual actors in a media analysis of this type is 
naturally extremely high – including overstretched borrowers who only speak once, for instance. 
Second, my analysis runs over the course of three years, and individuals’ blaming patterns are volatile. 
Two actors might have similar blaming patterns at the beginning, and dissimilar patterns at the end. 
Clustering them on the basis of their overall blaming patterns runs the risk of not capturing these 
trajectories. Third my trials of community detection methods remained inconclusive. Similarities in 
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patterns did not lead to the construction of meaningful categories. Actors’ logic of action is better 
understood by re-embedding them in a field. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1: Blaming targets by category and by period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Correlations between monthly blame matrices (QAP)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Distribution of blame per period 
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Figure 4: Number of blaming incidences per month 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5: Number of blaming instances per period, Democrats and Republicans  
 
 
  
  
Figure 6: Number of blaming instances, periods 2a and 2b, Democrats and Republicans 
  
  
  
  
Figure 7: Number of mentions of Goldman Sachs per period 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 8 (a, b, c, d): Matrices of blame per period (period 1, period 2, period 3, period 4)  
NB: The scale varies period by period. For simplicity, the category “Other” is not displayed in the matrices. 
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 Figure 9: Matrix of Blame, Whole Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Figure 10: Matrix of Blame, Government, Whole Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Categories and sub-categories of coding 
 
Categories Government Finance Housing Borrowers Intellectuals 
General 
public 
Other 
Sub-
categories 
Obama adm. Banks 
Mortgage 
lenders 
Borrowers Journalists 
Letter 
writers 
Rest of the 
world 
Democrats 
Credit rating 
agencies 
Mortgage 
brokers 
Consumer 
advocates 
Academia Polls Auto industry 
Republicans AIG 
Appraisers / 
Real estate 
developers / 
Agents 
 
Writer Unknown Business world 
Bush adm. 
Funds / 
Investors 
   
Elite 
Regulators Wall Street  
   Other 
(other) 
Prosecutors 
Other 
(finance) 
 
    
Washington 
      
Other 
(government) 
      
 
 
 Table 2: Gram preceding the word “crisis” - Difference in observed occurrence in a time 
period and expected probability of occurrence in the corpus  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 3:  Summary of the stage model of the crisis 
 
Period 
Intensity 
of blame 
(Fig. 4) 
Opening 
vs Closure 
(Fig. 3) 
Targets 
of blame 
(Fig. 1) 
Definition 
of the 
crisis 
(Table 2) 
Stage model 
1 Low Midway 
Finance 
Government 
Housing 
Borrowers 
Mortgage 
crisis 
Unawareness 
2 High Opening 
Finance 
Government 
Financial 
crisis 
“The” 
crisis 
Turmoil 
3 Medium Midway 
Finance 
Government 
Financial 
crisis 
“The” 
crisis 
Stabilization 
4 High Closure Finance 
Financial 
crisis 
“The” 
crisis 
Recent / 
Next crisis 
Settlement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4: Top 6 targets of blame, Democrats and Republicans, Whole period 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table 5: Top 6 targets of blame, Whole dataset, Periods 2a and 2b 
 
